State of Utah, Office of Recovery Services and Robyn K. Adams vs. Michael H. Mudd : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1995
State of Utah, Office of Recovery Services and
Robyn K. Adams vs. Michael H. Mudd : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Michael H. Mudd; appellant.
Steven A. Combe; attorney for appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, State of Utah v. Mudd, No. 950468 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6766
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, Office of 
Recovery Services and 
ROBYN K. * M S f 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
MICHAEL H. MODD, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
>' Case No. 950468-CA 
1 Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
[EAL FROM ORDER ENTERED JULY 19, 1995, BY 
HONORABLE BRENT W. WEST, SECOND JUDICIAL 
STRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
«IT#; 
UTAH 
D f • 
K. 
50 
.A; 
&tfu&#r/s 
STEVEN A. COMBE - #5456 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM - #1231 
Utah Attorney General 
2540 Washington Blvd., 7th Floor 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Appellee 
MICHAEL H.'MUDD, pro se 
Twin Rivers Correction Center 
P.O. Box 888 
Monroe, WA 98272 
Appellant 
4
 9 1996 
COURT ^ APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, Office of ] 
Recovery Services and ) 
ROBYN K. ADAMS, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
vs. 
MICHAEL H. MUDD, ] 
Defendant and Appellant. 
} Case No. 950468-CA 
) Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM ORDER ENTERED JULY 19, 1995, BY 
THE HONORABLE BRENT W. WEST, SECOND JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN A. COMBE - #5456 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM - #1231 
Utah Attorney General 
2540 Washington Blvd., 7th Floor 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Appellee 
MICHAEL H. MUDD, pro se 
Twin Rivers Correction Center 
P.O. Box 888 
Monroe, WA 98272 
Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii-iii 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2-4 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 4-5 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 5-8 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 8-9 
ARGUMENT 10-18 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-12-22 (SUPP. 1995) DID NOT BAR THE STATE OF 
UTAH FROM SEEKING A JUDGMENT FOR THE CHILD SUPPORT 
DELINQUENCY 10 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THERE 
EXISTED NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AND 
THE STATE OF UTAH WAS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A 
MATTER OF LAW 12 
III. ISSUES NOT DECIDED BY THE TRIAL COURT ARE NOT 
REVIEWABLE ON APPEAL 18 
CONCLUSION 19 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 20 
ADDENDUM 21 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Broberg v. Hess. 782 P.2d 198 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 19 
Crockett v. Crockett. 836 P.2d 818 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) . . . 15 
Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co.. 
659 P.2nd 1040 (Utah 1983) 15,17 
Frisbee v. K & K Construction. 676 P.2d 387 (Utah 1984) . . . 15 
Frontier Founds, v. Layton Constr.. 818 P.2d 1040 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) 2 
Gramlich v. Munsey. 838 P.2d 1131 (Utah 1992) 2 
Hansen v. Department of Fin. Insts.. 858 P.2d 184 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) 2 
Keith O-Brien C. v. Snyder. 169 P. 954 (Utah 1917) 11 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Atkin. 
Wright and Miles. Chartered. 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984) . . . 16 
Qlwell v, Clark, 658 P.2d 585 (Utah 1982) 16 
O'Neal v. Division of Family Services. 821 P.2d 1139 
(Utah 1991) 2 
Surety Life Insurance Co. v. Smith. 892 P.2d 1 
(Utah 1995) 2 
Thornblad v. Thornblad. 849 P.2d 1197 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). . 15 
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Kearl. 896 P.2d 644 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995) 2 
Traynor v. Cushing. 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984) 19 
Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983) 12 
ii 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6 (1995) 14 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-22 (Supp. 1995) 9,10 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 (1992) 10 
iii 
IN" THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, Office of 
Recovery Services and 
ROBYN K A D AMS, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
vs. 
MICHAEL H. MUDD, 
Defendant and Appellant 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
t I: ic s jii :ii : t:i ::: i 1 ]::: i 1:1 : si lai i t I: : I Jt s .1 1 Code A 111 :i 
§ 7 8 - 2 a - 3 { 2 ) u ) ( S u p p . 1 9 9 5 ) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES • 
1. Whether the trial court correctly concluded that there 
<:. - . "... . - . * ,h 
was entitled \ judgment for delinquent: child support as a matter 
01 law. 
2. Whether the trial court correctly concluded that Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-22 (Supp. 1995) did not bar the State of Utah 
f:i : : 1 t seekii lg a ji 1 igment f> 1 1 : • :i 2] :i 1 lqi l e n t : 1 :i :i 1 I s u p ip< : :i : !: 
1 
C a s e No. S5G-ib& vJA 
P r i o r i t y No. 15 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary Judgment presents a question of law which this Court 
reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's 
determination. See Surety Life Insurance Co. v. Smith, 892 P. 2d 
1, 2 (Utah 1995); Travelers Jngmrgtpge CP, Vt Kearl, 896 P.2d 644, 
646 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
In determining whether the trial court correctly found that 
there were no genuine issues of material fact, the facts and all 
reasonable inferences are viewed in a light most favorable to the 
party opposing the motion. See Frontier Founds. v. Layton 
Constr., 818 P.2d 1040 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Whether a statute of limitation has expired is a question of 
law reviewed for correctness, with no deference to the trial 
court's determination. See Gramlich v. Munsey, 838 P. 2d 1131 
(Utah 1992); O'Neal v. Division of Family Services. 821 P.2d 1139 
(Utah 1991); Hansen v. Department of Fin. Insts., 858 P.2d 184 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 12, 1985, the Second Judicial District Court 
approved a Petition for Acknowledgment of Paternity, Order of 
Support, and Waiver, and signed a Judgment and Order Based on 
2 
Acknowledgment of Voluntary Paternity consistent with the terms 
of Defendant's Affidavit Acknowledging Paternity and Duty of 
Support, Consent to Judgment and Entry of General Appearance, 
signed by appellant Michael H. Mudd ("Mudd") on February 7, 1985 
(R. 1 - 8) . 
On October 18, 1994, the State filed an Order to Show Cause 
seeking judgment for a child support delinquency, which was 
served upon Mudd on October 31, 1994 (R. 10-12, 16) . 
On December 22, 1994, Mudd filed a Motion for Order to 
Dismiss and Affidavit in Support of Motion for Order to Dismiss, 
alleging that the statute of limitations barred the State from 
seeking a judgment (R. 53-55). On or about January 4, 1995, the 
State filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss (R. 64). On January 30, 1995, the District Court entered 
a memorandum decision denying Mudd's motion (R. 60). On February 
22, 1995, the District Court entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss (R. 76-79). 
On or about May 4, 1995, the State of Utah filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and Affidavit, seeking a child support judgment for the 
period of March 15, 1985 through April 30, 1995 (R. 139-144). On 
3 
June 20, 1995, the District Court entered a memorandum decision 
granting the State's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 133-134). 
On July 19, 1995, the District Court entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order consistent with the Court memorandum 
decision (R. 155-160). On July 20, 1995, Mudd filed a Notice of 
Appeal (R. 161) . On August 7, 1995, Mudd filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 163-
171) . 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-22 (Supp. 1995) provides: 
Within eight years an action: 
(1) upon a judgment or decree of any court of 
United States or of any state or territory within 
the United States. 
(2) to enforce any liability due or to become 
due, for failure to provide support or maintenance 
for dependent children. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 (1992) provides: 
Where a cause of action accrues against a 
person when he is out of the state, the action 
may be commenced within the term as limited by 
this chapter after his return to the state. If 
after a cause of action accrues he departs from 
the state, the time of his absence is not part 
of the time limited for the commencement of the 
action. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6 (1995), provides in part: 
(1) Each payment or installment of child 
or spousal support order, as defined by 
Subsection 62A-11-401(3), is, on and after 
the date it is due: 
(a) a judgment with the same attributes 
and effect of any judgment of a district 
court, except as provided in Subsection 
(2) ; 
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to full 
faith and credit in this and in any other 
jurisdiction; and 
(c) not subject to retroactive modification 
by this or any other jurisdiction, except as 
provided in Subsection (2). 
(2) A child or spousal support payment 
under a child support order may be modified 
with respect to any period which a petition 
for modification is pending, but only from 
the date notice of that petition was given 
to the obligee, if the obligor is 
the petitioner, or to the obligor, if the 
obligee is the petitioner. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 12, 1985, the Second Judicial District Court 
approved a Petition for Acknowledgment of Paternity, Order of 
Support, and Waiver, and signed a Judgment and Order Based on 
Acknowledgment of Voluntary Paternity consistent with the terms 
of Defendant's Affidavit Acknowledging Paternity and Duty of 
Support, Consent to Judgment and Entry of General Appearance, 
5 
signed by appellant Michael H. Mudd ("Mudd") on February 7, 1985 
(R. 1-8). The Judgment and Order declared Mudd to be the father 
of Michael Mudd Jr., born November 1, 1984, to Robyn K. Robinette 
(R. 4). The Judgment and Order required Mudd to provide for the 
education and other necessary expenses of the child and to pay 
the amount of one hundred dollars and 00/100 ($100.00) per month 
for child support until the child reaches the age of majority; 
the monthly payments to be made on or before the 15th day of each 
month commencing with the month of March, 1985 (R. 4) . The 
Judgment and Order also awarded two judgments, totaling 
$1,600.00, for medical and hospital expenses, HL-A blood testing, 
and child support arrears (R. 4). 
Shortly after paternity was established, Mudd left the State 
of Utah (R. 76-79) . In January 1990, Mudd was incarcerated in 
the Twin Rivers Correction Center in Monroe, Washington, where he 
remains incarcerated (R. 20, 42, 44, 77). 
On October 18, 1994, the State filed an Order to Show Cause 
seeking judgment for a child support delinquency, which was 
served upon Mudd on October 31, 1994 (R. 10-12, 16) . 
On December 22, 1994, Mudd filed a Motion for Order to 
Dismiss and Affidavit in Support of Motion for Order to Dismiss, 
alleging that the statute of limitations barred the State from 
6 
seeking a judgment (R. 53-55). On or about January 4, 1995, the 
State filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss (R. 64-67) . On January 30, 1995, the District Court 
entered a memorandum decision denying defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss (R. 60) . On February 22, 1995, the District Court 
entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order Denying 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The Court found that Mudd left 
the State of Utah shortly after paternity was established in 
March 1985, had resided in several different states, and had been 
incarcerated in the Twin Rivers Correction Center in the State of 
Washington since at least June 1993. The Court concluded that as 
a result of Mudd's absence from the State of Utah, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-22 (1995) did not bar the State of Utah from seeking a 
judgment for any child support that had accrued under the 
Judgment and Order Based on Acknowledgment of Voluntary Paternity 
(R. 76-79). 
On or about May 4, 1995, the State of Utah filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and Affidavit, seeking judgment for the period of March 
15, 1985 through April 30, 1995 (R. 139-144). On June 20, 1995, 
the District Court entered a memorandum decision granting the 
State's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 133-134). On July 19, 
7 
1995, the District Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Order consistent with the Court's memorandum decision 
(R. 155-160) . On July 20, 1995, Mudd filed a Notice of Appeal 
(R. 161). On August 7, 1995, Mudd filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 163). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-22 (Supp. 1995) provides for an eight 
year statute of limitation to enforce any liability due or to 
become due for failure to provide support or maintenance for 
dependant children. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 (1992) provides 
that a statute of limitation is tolled for the period of time 
that a person is absent from the state after the cause of action 
accrues. In this case, it is undisputed that appellant was 
absent from the State of Utah for more than five years prior to 
the time this judgment was entered, having been incarcerated in 
the Twin Rivers Correction Center in Monroe, Washington (R. 20, 
42, 44, 77). The statute of limitation was tolled during his 
absence. Therefore, section 78-12-22 would not bar the State 
from seeking a judgment for any support which accrued under the 
Judgment and Order Based on Acknowledgment of Voluntary 
Paternity. 
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On or about May 4, 1995, the State of Utah filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and Affidavit, seeking a child support judgment for the 
period of March 15, 1985 through April 30, 1995 (R. 139-144). 
Appellant failed to timely file a response to the State's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides that when a motion for summary judgment is 
made and properly supported, an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
The trial court properly determined from the evidence 
presented that there was no genuine issue of material fact and 
the State was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
On August 7, 1995, Mudd untimely filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 163-
171) . 
Finally, Mudd improperly raises issues on appeal that were 
not ruled upon by the trial court. This includes Mudd's Petition 
to Modify Child Support, and Motion for Payment of Costs and 
Fees. It is premature for the Court to consider these issues. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-12-22 (SUPP. 1995) DID NOT BAR THE STATE OF 
UTAH FROM SEEKING A JUDGMENT FOR THE CHILD SUPPORT 
DELINQUENCY. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-22 (Supp. 1995) provides the 
following statute of limitation: 
Within eight years an action: 
(1) upon a judgment or decree of any court of 
the United States or of any state or territory 
within the United States. 
(2) to enforce any liability due or to become 
due, for failure to provide support or maintenance 
for dependant children. 
Section 78-12-22 is not a bar to any action brought to 
enforce a child support liability which accrued for a period of 
eight years prior to the initiation of an action. In this case, 
the State of Utah filed its Motion for Order to Show Cause with 
the Court on October 4, 1994. Therefore, the statute of 
limitation would not apply to any support which accrued after 
October 5, 1986. The only support that would be subject to the 
statute of limitation would be support that accrued between March 
15, 1985 and October 4, 1986, a period of approximately 1 year 
and 7 months. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 (1992) provides that a statute of 
10 
limitation is tolled as follows: 
Where a cause of action accrues against a 
person when he is out of the state, the action 
may be commenced within the term as limited by 
this chapter after his return to the state. If 
&fter a CfrUge pf action frgqrues he departs frQm 
the Statei the time pf hig frfrgenge j g not Pftrt 
pf the time limited fpr the commencement pf the 
action. 
(emphasis added). 
Shortly after parternity was established, Mudd left the 
State of Utah (R. 76-79). Mudd has been incarcerated in the Twin 
Rivers Correction Center in Monroe, Washington, since January 
1990 (R. 20, 42, 44, 77) . It is well established in this 
jurisdiction that the time period of defendant's absence can be 
added to the limitation period. See Keith-O'Brien Co. v. Snyder, 
169 P. 954 (Utah 1917) . In other words, the time period that 
Mudd was absent from the State well exceeded 1 year and 7 months, 
and therefore any past due support that accrued between March 15, 
1985 and October 4, 1986, would also not be subject to the 
statute of limitation. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THERE EXISTED 
NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AND THE STATE OF UTAH 
WAS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in 
part: 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover 
upon a claim ... may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement 
of the action ... move with or without supporting 
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor 
upon all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motions and proceedings thereon. ... 
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith 
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
A "major purpose of summary judgment is to allow the parties to 
pierce the pleadings to determine whether there is a genuine 
issue of fact." Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 
1983) . 
The State of Utah initiated the current support collection 
action by serving Mudd with a Order to Show Cause seeking 
judgment for a child support delinquency (R. 10-12, 16) . In 
response to the Order to Show Cause, Mudd filed a Motion for 
Order to Dismiss and Affidavit in Support of Motion for Order to 
12 
Dismiss, alleging that the statute of limitation barred the State 
from seeking a judgment (R. 53-55) . On February 22, 1995, the 
District Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The Court 
specifically found that as a result of Mudd's absence from the 
State of Utah, section 78-12-22 would not bar the State of Utah 
from seeking a judgment for any support that accrued under the 
Judgment and Order Based on Acknowledgment of Voluntary Paternity 
(R. 76-79). 
On or about May 4, 1995, the State of Utah filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and Affidavit, seeking judgment for the period of March 
15, 1985 through April 30, 1995 (R. 139-144).x 
In support of its motion, the State alleged that on February 
12, 1985, the Second Judicial District Court approved a Petition 
for Acknowledgment of Voluntary Paternity, Order of Support, and 
Waiver, and signed a Judgment and Order Based on Acknowledgment 
of Paternity consistent with the terms of Defendant's Affidavit 
Acknowledging Paternity and Duty of Support, Consent to Judgment 
and Entry of General Appearance signed by Mudd on February 7, 
1
 Mudd apparently received the Motion for Summary Judgment on May 8, 
1995 (R. at 166). 
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1985 (R. 1 - 8). The Judgment and Order declared Mudd to be the 
father of Michael Mudd Jr., born November 1, 1984, to Robyn K. 
Robinette (R. 4) . The Judgment and Order required Mudd to 
"provide for the education and other necessary expenses of the 
child (ren) and to pay the amount of one hundred dollars and 
00/100 ($100,00) per month as and for child support... commencing 
with the month of March, 1985" (R. 4). 
According to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6 (1995), 
(1) Each payment or installment of child 
or spousal support order, as defined by 
Subsection 62A-11-401(3), is, on and after 
the date it is due: 
(a) a judgment with the same attributes 
and effect of any judgment of a district 
court, except as provided in Subsection 
(2) ; 
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to full 
faith and credit in this and in any other 
jurisdiction; and 
(c) not subject to retroactive modification 
by this or any other jurisdiction, except as 
provided in Subsection (2). 
(2) A child or spousal support payment 
under a child support order may be modified 
with respect to any period which a petition 
for modification is pending, but only from 
the date notice of that petition was given 
to the obligee, if the obligor is given to 
the petitioner, or to the obligor, if the 
obligee is petitioner. 
Each payment or installment of child support under the 
Judgment and Order Based on Acknowledgment of Voluntary Paternity 
14 
became a monthly s t a tu to ry judgment, not subject to r e t roac t ive 
modification, on and a f t e r the date i t was due. See Thornblad v. 
Thornblad. 849 P. 2d 1197 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Crockett v. 
Crockett, 836 P.2d 818 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
The State of Utah, Department of Human Services, Office of 
Recovery Services, has been responsible for support enforcement 
in t h i s case since i t s incept ion. Therefore, when the State 
f i l ed i t s Motion for Summary Judgment, a representa t ive of tha t 
agency signed an a f f idavi t indica t ing tha t no ongoing support 
payments were made to the agency between March 1985 and April 
1995.2 Though the a f f idavi t contained a minor e r ro r , Mudd did 
not object to the a f f idavi t and i s deemed to have waived his 
opposition to any evident iary defect thereof.3 
2
 The S t a t e acknowledges t h a t due t o an i n a d v e r t e n t e r r o r the 
defendant was not p r o p e r l y given c r e d i t for some d iminut ive ongoing support 
payments. This e r r o r would have been r e a d i l y d iscovered had Mudd simply 
t imely f i l e d a response t o the S t a t e ' s Motion for Summary Judgment. Mudd has 
now been given c r e d i t for a l l payments made. 
Mudd a l s o a l l e g e s t h a t he was not c r e d i t e d for t ax refund i n t e r c e p t s made 
in 1985 and 1994. In suppor t , Mudd submits a document from the I n t e r n a l 
Revenue Service never r a i s e d before the t r i a l cou r t , not of record , and not 
p r o p e r l y before the a p p e l l a t e c o u r t . Nonetheless , for the b e n e f i t of the 
Court, the S t a t e no tes t h a t any refunds i n t e r c e p t e d would have f i r s t been 
app l i ed toward the o l d e s t e x i s t i n g judgments, presumably the two judgments 
en te red in the Judgment and Order Based on Acknowledgment of Voluntary 
P a t e r n i t y . 
3
 In F rank l in F inanc ia l v . New Empire Dev. Co. . 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 
(Utah 1983), t he Utah Supreme Court he ld t h a t "on a motion for summary 
judgment, an opposing p a r t y f a i l s t o move t o s t r i k e d e f e c t i v e a f f i d a v i t s , he 
i s deemed to have waived h i s oppos i t ion t o whatever e v i d e n t i a r y de fec t s may 
e x i s t . " c i t i n g Howick v . Bank of S a l t Lake. 498 P.2d 352 (Utah 1972); Fox v. 
15 
Mudd failed to timely file a response to the State's Motion 
for Summary Judgment.4 Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides in part, "[w]hen a motion for summary judgment 
is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party 
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, 
summary judgment. if appropriate, shall be entered against him." 
(Emphasis added) 
Rule 56 does not always mandate that the non-moving party 
respond in order to avoid judgment against him, since the trial 
court must still determine that judgment is "appropriate". See 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin. Wright & Miles. 
Chartered. 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984); Qlwell v. Clark. 658 P.2d 
585 (Utah 1982). Nonetheless, the Utah Supreme Court issued the 
following caution: 
Thus when a party opposes a properly supported 
Allstate Insurance Co.. 453 P.2d 701 (Utah 1969); see also Frisbee v. K & K 
Constr., 676 P.2d 387, 389, 390 (Utah 1984). 
4
 Appellant did not file his Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgement until August 7, 1995, more than 3 months after 
the State filed its Motion for Summary Judgment and more than two weeks after 
filing his Notice of Appeal. 
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motion for summary judgment and fails to 
file any responsive affidavits or other 
evidentiary materials allowed by Rule 56 (e), 
the trial court may properly conclude 
that there are no genuine issues of fact 
unless the movant's affidavit affirmatively 
discloses the existence of such an issue. 
Franklin Financial, 659 P.2d at 1044. 
The trial court properly determined from the evidence 
presented that there existed no genuine issues of material fact. 
Once the trial court determined that summary judgment was 
appropriate, the actual amount of judgment became a simple 
mathematical computation.5 
On August 7, 1995, Mudd untimely filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Even if 
Mudd's response had been timely filed, summary judgment would 
would have remained appropriate, though the amount of judgment 
possibly adjusted. 
Mudd's memorandum was not supported by any affidavits and 
included primarily unsupported and false allegations, and 
references to evidence not admissible or not of record. Rule 
56(e) provides that, u [a] n adverse party may not rest upon the 
Judgment was entered in the amount of $12,150.00 for the period of 
March 15, 1985 and April 30, 1995, a total of 121 % months at the rate of 
$100.00 per month. 
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mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." 
Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The only genuine issue of fact included in Mudd's memorandum 
was whether he had been given credit for some minor ongoing 
support payments. If Mudd had simply timely filed a response to 
the Motion for Summary Judgment, this would have been 
undisputed.6 Given the opportunity, the State would have filed 
an amended affidavit showing the payments had been made, and this 
fact would no longer have been at issue. Therefore, this fact 
would not have prevented the court from properly entering summary 
judgment, though it may have slightly affected the amount of 
j udgment. 
POINT III 
ISSUES NOT PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR DECISION 
ARE NOT REVIEWABLE ON APPEAL• 
Mudd i m p r o p e r l y r a i s e s i s s u e s on a p p e a l t h a t w e r e n o t r u l e d 
6
 See Supra foo tno te 2 . Mudd a l s o r e f e r s t o an i n c o n s i s t e n c y between 
the judgment amount sought in the S t a t e ' s Motion for Summary Judgment and 
correspondence r ece ived from the Office of Recovery S e r v i c e s . Any 
i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s due p r i m a r i l y t o a erroneous presumption by the agency t h a t 
t he s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n was a p p l i c a b l e . 
18 
upon by the trial court. This includes Mudd's Petition to Modify 
Child Support, and Motion for Payment of Costs and Fees. This 
Court has held that "when there is no indication in the record on 
appeal that the trial court reached or ruled on an issue, this 
Court will not undertake to consider the issue on appeal." 
Broberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citing State 
v. Pacheco. 778 P. 2d 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)); see also Traynor 
v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 857 (Utah 1984). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State of Utah respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm the summary judgment entered in 
its favor. 
DATED this // day of /^4/CJA. , 1996. 
(S^u. 
^EVEN A. COMBE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
2 1 
DIVORCE 30-3-11 
30-3-10.6. Payment under child support order — Judg-
ment. 
(1) Each payment or installment of child or spousal support under any child 
support order, as defined by Subsection 62A-11-40K3), is, on and after the date 
it is due: 
(a) a judgment with the same attributes and effect of any judgment of 
a district court, except as provided in Subsection (2); 
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to full faith and credit in this and in any 
other jurisdiction; and 
(c) not subject to retroactive modification by this or any other jurisdic-
tion, except as provided in Subsection (2). 
(2) A child or spousal support payment under a child support order may be 
modified with respect to any period during which a petition for modification is 
pending, but only from the date notice of that petition was given to the obligee, 
if the obligor is the petitioner, or to the obligor, if the obligee is the petitioner. 
(3) For purposes of this section, "jurisdiction" means a state or political 
subdivision, a territory or possession of the United States, the District of 
Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
(4) The judgment provided for in Subsection (l)(a), to be effective and 
enforceable as a lien against the real property interest of any third party 
relying on the public record, shall be docketed in the district court in 
accordance with Sections 78-22-1 and 62A-11-311. 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-10.6, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 117, § 1; 1988, ch. 1, § 3; 1988, ch. 
203, § 1; 1989, ch. 62, § 1; ch. 115, § 1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Retroactive modification. 
Cited. 
ANALYSIS Cited in McReynolds v. McReynolds, 787 
P.2d 530 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Adelman v. 
Adelman, 815 P.2d 741 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); 
Crockett v. Crockett, 836 R2d 818 (Utah Ct. 
Retroactive modification. App. 1992); Thornblad v. Thornblad, 849 P.2d 
The general rule is to prohibit retroactive 1 1 9 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Nunley v. Brooks, 
modification of family support obligations; thus 247 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
temporary support orders may not be retroac-
tively modified. Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 
P.2d 814 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AX.R. — Spouse's right to set off debt owed 
by other spouse against accrued spousal or 
child support payments, 11 A.L.R.5th 259. 
30-3-11. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 30-3-11 (L. 1957, ch. 55, and family relationships, was repealed by Laws 
§ 2), declaring a public policy to foster marital 1961, ch. 59, § 2. 
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78-12-22 JUDICIAL CODE 108 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-20; L. 1995, ch. 20, § 156. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 1995, substituted "Sec-
tions 78-12-18 and 78-12-19* for The two pre-
ceding sections" at the beginning of the section; 
subdivided the existing single sentence into two 
sentences by deleting "but a i r following "ac-
crues" and adding "Air before "such"; and sub-
stituted "Section 78-12-21" for "the next preced-
ing section" at the end of the section. 
ARTICLE 2 
OTHER THAN REAL PROPERTY 
78-12-22. Within eight years. 
Within eight years an action: 
(1) upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States, or of 
any state or territory within the United States. 
(2) to enforce any liability due or to become due, for failure to provide 
support or maintenance for dependent children. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-22; L. 1975, ch. 96, § 26; 1992, 
ch. 30, § 177. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective April 27, 1992, made stylistic 
changes. 
78-12-23. Within six years — Mesne profits of real prop-
erty — Instrument in writing — Distribution of 
criminal proceeds to victim. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Breach of contract. 
Running of statute. 
—Reformation of agreements. 
Breach of contract. 
When a contract for the sale of land provided 
no remedy in the event of the seller's default or 
refusal to perform, the buyer's right to recover 
money paid was not founded upon a written 
instrument, but rather upon an implied right to 
recover, therefore, the four-year statute of limi-
tations in § 78-12-25(1) applied, and the trial 
78-12-25. Within four years. 
court erred in concluding that the buyer's claim 
fell within the six-year period of this section. 
McKean v. McBride, 884 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994). 
Running of statute. 
—Reformation of agreements. 
Claim for reformation of 1975 agreements 
was barred by Subsection (2) of this section, 
requiring actions based on a written contract to 
be brought within six years. United Park City 
Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 
880 (Utah 1993). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Breach of fiduciary duty. 
Discovery rule. 
Equitable actions. 
Federal civil rights actions. 
Land contract. 
Negligent employment. 
Personal injuries. 
Product liability. 
Relation back of complaints. 
Running of statute. 
Tax paid under protest. 
Tblling. 
—Class actions. 
Cited. 
Breach of fiduciary duty. 
Claim against parties for inducing, aiding, 
and abetting mining corporations in breaching 
their fiduciary duty was dismissed since the 
acts complained of occurred more than four 
years prior to the instigation of the lawsuit. 
United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park 
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 78-12-35 
(b) Subsection (a) provides for actions not yet barred, and also acts 
retroactively to permit actions under this section that are otherwise 
barred. 
(2) As used in this section, "asbestos" means asbestiform varieties of: 
(a) chrysotile (serpentine); 
(b) crocidolite (riebeckite); 
(c) amosite (cummingtonite-grunerite); 
(d) anthophyllite; 
(e) tremolite; or 
(f) actinolite. 
History: C. 1953, 78-12-33.5, enacted by L. came effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to 
1988, ch. 208, § 2. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 208 be-
78-12-34. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 78-12-34 (L. 1951, ch. bank deposits of money or property, was re-
58, § 1; C. 1943, Supp., 104-12-34), providing pealed by Laws 1981, ch. 16, § 1. 
that there is no limitation in actions to recover 
ARTICLE 3 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
78-12-35. Effect of absence from state. 
Where a cause of action accrues against a person when he is out of the state, 
the action may be commenced within the term as limited by this chapter after 
his return to the state. If after a cause of action accrues he departs from the 
state, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the commence-
ment of the action. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 
Supp., 104-12-35; 1987, ch. 19, § 4. 
1943, 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
"Absence" from state. 
—Nonresident motorists. 
Applicability of section. 
—Nonresidents. 
—Personal representative of estate. 
Burden of proof. 
Computation of time. 
—Periods of absence. 
Construction of section. 
—Strict. 
Foreign corporation. 
—Pleadings and evidence. 
Laches. 
—Accounting. 
Purpose of section. 
Residence within state. 
—Continual. 
Proof of presence, 
—Defendant's family. 
—Statute tolled. 
"Absence" from state. 
—Nonresident motorists. 
Nonresident motorists were not "absent" 
from the state so as to toll running of statute of 
limitations, although they left state immedi-
ately after automobile collision and remained 
without state, as they had an agent in person 
of secretary of state upon whom process could 
have been served. Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d 
254, 390 P.2d 915 (1964). 
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